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INTRODUCTION
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) protects consumers by
preventing anticompetitive, deceptive, and unfair business practices.1
The FTC was created in 1914 when President Woodrow Wilson signed
the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”) into law.2 The FTC
Act responded to the need for expanded antitrust laws and gave the
FTC authority to regulate those laws.3 Congress vested this power in
the FTC with the intent that the agency serve as the principal expert
authority on anticompetitive business practices.4 The Senate
Committee on Interstate Commerce instructed that the FTC’s staff
would consist of experts in business, law, and economics; their unique
* J.D. candidate, May 2020, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; Creighton University, B.A. in Psychology, minor in Business
Administration, May 2017.
1
About the FTC, FTC.GOV (Sept. 23, 2019, 10:25
AM), https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc.
2
Id. (explaining that the FTC Act passed the Senate on September 8, 1914,
passed the House on September 10, 1914, and became law on September 26, 1914).
3
Jeffrey Liebling, Judicial Usurpation of the F.T.C.’s Authority: A Return to
the Rule of Reason, 30 J. Marshall L. Rev. 283, 286 (1996).
4
Id.
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expertise would make them “more competent . . . than any court” in
evaluating and ensuring fair business practices.5 Congress thus
provided the FTC with broad authority6 and further anticipated that
federal judges would defer to the FTC’s judgment on matters within
the realm of its expertise.7
Over a century after its inception, the FTC remains the most
efficient regulator of commerce in the United States.8 To carry out its
mission—to “protect consumers and promote competition”—the FTC
leans heavily on its authority under the FTC Act.9 The FTC Act
allows the FTC to:
(a) prevent unfair methods of competition, and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce; (b) seek
monetary redress and other relief for conduct injurious to
consumers; (c) prescribe trade regulation rules defining with
specificity acts or practices that are unfair or deceptive, and
establishing requirements designed to prevent such acts or
practices; (d) conduct investigations relating to the
organization, business, practices, and management of entities
engaged in commerce; and (e) make reports and legislative
recommendations to Congress.10

5

51 CONG. REC. 11,083 (June 25, 1914) (remarks of Sen. Newlands).
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. F.T.C., 729 F.2d 128, 136 (2d Cir. 1989).
7
Recent Development: Federal Agency Focus: Federal Trade Commission:
The Quality of Appointments and the Capability of the Federal Trade Commission,
49 ADMIN. L. REV. 915, 919 (1997).
8
See 51 CONG. REC. 14,770 (1914).
9
About the FTC, FTC.GOV (Sept. 23, 2019, 10:25 AM),
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/our-history (the FTC further educates consumers and
businesses regarding their rights and responsibilities as market participants, reviews
potential mergers and challenges them when necessary, and collects complaints
“about hundreds of issues from data security and deceptive advertising to identity
theft and Do Not Call violations”).
10
Enforcement, FTC.GOV (Sept. 23, 2019, 10:25
AM), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/statutes/federal-trade-commission-act.
6
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These powers fall into one of the FTC’s three principal areas of
authority: investigative, enforcement, and rulemaking.11 While FTC
activity depends equally on its investigative and rulemaking
authorities, this comment focuses principally on its enforcement
authority.12 The FTC relies on administrative and judicial proceedings
to enforce federal consumer protection and antitrust laws.13
Section 5(b) of the FTC Act introduces the FTC’s administrative
enforcement scheme.14 This section grants the FTC authority to
challenge “‘unfair or deceptive act[s] or practice[s],’ ‘unfair methods
of competition,’ or violations of other laws enforced through the FTC
Act, by instituting an administrative adjudication.”15 The FTC must
have a “reason to believe” that a business or individual has violated a
law before issuing a complaint to initiate a proceeding.16 After a
complaint is filed, the respondent may decide to either settle or contest
the charges.17 Settling the charges often results in a swift end to the
proceedings, but challenging the charges initiates a formal proceeding
in front of an administrative law judge.18 The administrative law judge
renders an initial decision which can be appealed within the FTC.19 On
appeal, the FTC reviews briefs, hears oral arguments, and issues a
final decision that respondents may appeal to a United States Court of
Appeals.20 If the Court of Appeals affirms the final decision then the
court enters an order of enforcement. 21 Losing parties may seek
review by the United States Supreme Court.22

11

Id.
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id. (Respondents may appeal final decisions to United States courts of
appeals where he or she resides or conducts business.).
21
Id.
22
Id.
12
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The FTC may also pursue judicial enforcement in connection with
a pending administrative proceeding even before determining that
challenged activity is unlawful.23 Specifically, section 13(b) of the
FTC Act gives the FTC the go-ahead to bring suit for injunctive relief
to prevent the violation of “any provision of law enforced by the
[FTC].”24 However, judicial enforcement under section 13(b) is
limited to occasions where the FTC has “reason to believe” that a
business or an individual “is violating, or is about to violate” any law
regulated by the FTC, pending an administrative proceeding to
determine that the conduct is in fact unlawful.25 The FTC most often
acts on its ability to seek judicially enforced injunctions under section
13(b) in cases involving consumer fraud and deception.26 The text of
section 13(b) states:
Whenever the Commission has reason to believe-(1) that any person, partnership, or corporation is violating, or
is about to violate, any provision of law enforced by the
Federal Trade Commission, and
(2) that the enjoining thereof pending the issuance of a
complaint by the Commission and until such complaint is
dismissed by the Commission or set aside by the court on
review, or until the order of the Commission made thereon
has become final, would be in the interest of the public—
the Commission . . . may bring suit in a district court of the
United States to enjoin any such act or practice. Upon a
proper showing that, weighing the equities and considering
the Commission's likelihood of ultimate success, such action
would be in the public interest, and after notice to the
defendant, a temporary restraining order or a preliminary
injunction may be granted without bond: Provided, however,
23

Id.
FTC Act § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
25
Enforcement, FTC.GOV (Sept. 23, 2019, 10:25
AM), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/statutes/federal-trade-commission-act.
26
Id.
24
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That if a complaint is not filed within such period (not
exceeding 20 days) as may be specified by the court after
issuance of the temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction, the order or injunction shall be dissolved by the
court and be of no further force and effect: Provided further,
That in proper cases the Commission may seek, and after
proper proof, the court may issue, a permanent injunction.27
It is the FTC’s position that section 13(b) authority extends not
only to the injunctive relief explicitly stated in the statute but also to
the “imposition of various kinds of monetary equitable relief (i.e.,
restitution and rescission of contracts) to remedy past violations.”28 To
be sure, restraining orders and injunctions are the sole remedies stated
in the text of section 13(b),29 but over thirty years of case law spanning
eight circuits supports the FTC’s interpretation. Yet the FTC’s long
enjoyment of section 13(b)’s broad remedial scope under this line of
precedent may have run its course—at least in the Seventh Circuit. A
three-judge panel recently held in Federal Trade Commission v. Credit
Bureau Center, LLC that section 13(b) does not implicitly grant the
FTC authority to seek restitution or any remedy other than the two
remedies explicitly stated in section 13(b): temporary restraining
orders and permanent injunctions.30 The court reasoned that an implied
restitution remedy does not “sit comfortably” with the plain text of
section 13(b) and recent Supreme Court developments.31
The Seventh Circuit’s narrow interpretation of section 13(b)’s
remedial scope is significant because it departs not only from the
circuit’s own long-standing precedent,32 but also splits with eight other
circuits that continue to award restitution and other equitable remedies

27

FTC Act § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
Enforcement, FTC.GOV (Sept. 23, 2019, 10:25
AM), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/statutes/federal-trade-commission-act.
29
FTC Act § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
30
FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC, 937 F.3d 764, 767 (7th Cir. 2019).
31
Id. at 772.
32
See FTC v. Amy Travel Service, Inc., 875 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1989).
28
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in addition to injunctive relief under section 13(b).33 It is noteworthy
that while the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Credit Bureau Center
stands alone, it emerged on the tail of the Third Circuit’s decision in
FTC v. Shire ViroPharma. Shire ViroPharma limited the types of
conduct for which the FTC may bring suit for in the Third Circuit
under section 13(b).34 The FTC must now present specific facts that
show a defendant “is violating or is about to violate” a law per the
language of the statute; section 13(b)’s grant to bring suit does not
extend to “a past violation and a reasonable likelihood of recurrent
future conduct.”35 Together, Credit Bureau Center and Shire
ViroPharma point to a concerning trend of courts curtailing the scope
of the FTC’s judicial enforcement efforts—a trend that leaves the FTC
particularly vulnerable.36
33

See FTC v. Commerce Planet, Inc., 815 F.3d 593, 598-99 (9th Cir. 2016);
FTC v. Ross, 743 F.3d 886, 890-92 (4th Cir. 2014); FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC,
654 F.3d 359, 365-66 (2d Cir. 2011); FTC v. Magazine Sols., LLC, 432 F. App’x
155, 158 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011); FTC v. Direct Mktg. Concepts, Inc., 624 F.3d 1, 15 (1st
Cir. 2010); FTC v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1202 n.6 (10th Cir.
2005); FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 468-70 (11th Cir. 1996); FTC v.
Security Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 1312, 1314-15 (8th Cir. 1991).
34
FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, Inc., 917 F.3d 147, 150 (3d Cir. 2019) (finding
that section 13(b)’s grant to bring suit when an individual or business “is violating or
is about to violate” a law enforced by the FTC does not apply to “a past violation
and a reasonable likelihood of recurrent future conduct”). Note that the Third Circuit
did not address the remedial scope of section 13(b) and has not had an occasion to do
so since Shire ViroPharma.
35
Id. The Third Circuit’s decision in Shire ViroPharma left important
questions unanswered. The court did not address what is an acceptable time period
following an end of unlawful conduct to bring a section 13(b) suit. For example, the
conduct in Shire ViroPharma ceased five years prior to the lawsuit and no evidence
indicated recurring conduct during that time period. But it remains unclear how the
court would treat a closer call such as unlawful conduct that ended only a month
prior to a lawsuit. See Mindy Pava & Khouryanna DiPrima, Section 13 (b)log:
Business As Usual? FTC Practice in the Wake of Shire ViroPharma and Credit
Bureau Center, AD LAW ACCESS (November 26, 2019, 2:50 PM),
https://www.adlawaccess.com/2019/10/articles/section-13-blog-business-as-usualftc-practice-in-the-wake-of-shire-viropharma-and-credit-bureau-center/.
36
See Shire ViroPharma Inc., 917 F.3d at 150; Credit Bureau Center, 937 F.3d
at 767; see also FTC v. AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC, 910 F.3d 417, 429 (9th Cir.
2018) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring) (urging the court to rehear the case en banc and
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This Comment explores the Seventh Circuit’s limitation on FTC
remedial authority under section 13(b) in four parts. Part one analyzes
the history and jurisprudence of the FTC’s enforcement power. Part
two details the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Credit Bureau Center.
Part three presents the Seventh Circuit’s analysis and argues that the
court erred by abruptly “[tying] the hands” of the FTC37 for two main
reasons. First, the court misinterpreted the text of section 13(b).
Second, the court relied heavily on a narrow, inapplicable Supreme
Court case while ignoring a separate line of Supreme Court cases that
are more on point.38 Part four discusses the implications of Credit
Bureau Center: how the decision offers “brazen scammers” a grant of
immunity39 and why FTC authority is now more vulnerable than ever.
Part five concludes by urging the Supreme Court to grant review of
Credit Bureau Center and restore the FTC’s enforcement authority by
reversing the decision of the Seventh Circuit.
FTC ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY: HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE
The Historical Path to Section 13(b)’s Current Remedial Scope
Originally the FTC’s ability to prevent unfair and deceptive
business practices was limited solely to section 5 of the FTC Act.40
Section 5 does not permit the FTC to challenge conduct directly in
district courts. To enforce section 5 violations the FTC depends instead
find that the text of section 13(b) does not support monetary relief); FTC v.
Hornbeam Special Situations, LLC, No. 1:17-cv-3094-TCB, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 204340, at *16 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 15, 2018) (finding that a monetary award
under section 13(b) is “not supported by the plain text of the statute, but has been
read into it by well-meaning judicial efforts to effect the ‘purpose’ of the
statute”).
37
Credit Bureau Center, 937 F.3d at 786 (Wood, C.J., dissenting).
38
See Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996).
39
Credit Bureau Center, 937 F.3d at 797 (Wood, C.J., dissenting).
40
David M. FitzGerald, The Genesis of Consumer Protection Remedies Under
Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, FTC.GOV (December 2, 2019, 3:35 PM),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/FTC%2090th%20A
nniversary%20Symposium/fitzgeraldremedies.pdf.
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on its administrative proceedings which produce cease-and-desist
orders.41 Section 5 allows for monetary penalties, but only for
violations of those cease-and-desist orders obtained through the
administrative process.42 Section 5 enforcement powers, when acting
alone, had two glaring shortcomings: section 5 did not allow the FTC
to immediately bar deceptive practices and section 5 did not provide
the FTC with any method of remedying the injury to the public.43
Immediate Action
First, the proceedings leading to a final cease-and-desist order
often take years to complete and during the process nothing prevents
the respondent from continuing the deceptive practices and causing
further harm to consumers.44 Congress took action to address this
problem by enacting the Wheeler-Lea Act in 1938.45 The Wheeler-Lea
Act added section 12 and section 13(a) to the FTC Act.46 Section 12
grants the FTC the ability to issue administrative cease-and-desist
orders when persons disseminate deceptive advertisements relating to
food, drugs, devices, services, or cosmetics.47 Section 13(a) allows the
FTC to pursue federal court action to obtain a preliminary injunction
preventing the dissemination of challenged advertisements under
section 12 during the FTC’s ongoing administrative proceedings.48 In
effect, the Wheeler-Lea Act allowed the FTC, for the first time, to take
immediate action to prohibit unfair business practices but only in cases
involving food, drugs, devices, services, or cosmetics:49 certainly
41

Id.
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. (explaining that the process for obtaining a final cease-and-desist order
could consist of a trial before an Administrative Law Judge, FTC review of the
Administrative Law Judge’s decision, and a court of appeals’ review of the FTC’s
decision); see also https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
42
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helpful, but a partial solution at best to the FTC’s lack of authority to
block deceptive conduct in a timely manner. Recognizing this, in 1973
Congress added section 13(b) to the FTC Act in the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline Act and gave the FTC authority to take swift action to obtain
injunctions and restraining orders to end deceptive practices that
violate “any provision of law.”50
Consumer Redress
Second, obtaining a cease-and-desist order under section 5 of the
FTC Act protected the public from future harm but it did not remedy
the injury to the public or deprive the violator of his ill-gotten gains.51
The FTC attempted to address this shortcoming on its own by
creatively applying section 5.52 The FTC held that it was a deceptive
practice in and of itself for a respondent to retain funds gained through
fraudulent or deceptive means and administratively ordered that
wrongdoers return those funds to consumers.53 But courts did not let
the FTC’s creative section 5 restitution demands stand on review, often
finding that such a remedy is “inconsistent” with the design of the
FTC Act.54 Congress responded in 1975 by adding section 19 to the
FTC Act.55 Section 19 allows the FTC to “seek consumer redress in
federal district court for either (1) violations of FTC trade regulation
rules, or (2) acts or practices as to which the Commission had issued a
final cease-and-desist order” so long as the FTC satisfies the court that
a reasonable person would have known that the act or practice was
dishonest or fraudulent.56 Section 19 expressly authorizes the FTC to

50

Id.; see also Robert D. Paul, The FTC's Increased Reliance on Section 13(b)
in Court Litigation, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 141 (1988) (stating that the FTC under 13(b)
could seek injunctions to prohibit violations not only of section 5 of the FTC Act,
any other provision of law enforced by the FTC).
51
FitzGerald, supra note 40.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
See id.; Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321, 323 (9th Cir. 1974).
55
FitzGerald, supra note 40.
56
Id.
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seek relief including monetary refunds and damages in court.57
However, the FTC can seek redress in court under section 19 only
after a final administrative cease-and-desist order is entered.58
Even though Congress enacted section 13(b) in 1973, two years
prior to its enactment of section 19, the FTC did not use section 13(b)
as a means to obtain consumer redress until the 1980’s.59 The FTC,
using section 13(b) then began to obtain an array of remedies under
section 13(b) such as restitution, disgorgement, asset freezes, and
receiverships.60 Because of this development the FTC could now
directly sue respondents in federal court and receive a judicial order
compelling wrongdoers to return funds deceptively taken from
consumers before making an agency determination that the conduct
was in fact unlawful.61 This distinguishes the consumer redress aspect
of section 13(b) from that of section 19.62
The FTC has continued this practice since the 1980s, and until
Credit Bureau Center courts have never interpreted section 19’s
explicit grant to pursue consumer redress in federal court as
foreclosing FTC authority to seek consumer redress under section
13(b). In fact, section 19 contains a preservation of remedies
provision, which states: “Remedies provided in [Section 19] are in
addition to, and not in lieu of, any other remedy or right of action
57

Id.
FTC Act § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 57(b); A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade
Commission's Investigative, Law Enforcement, and Rulemaking Authority, FTC.GOV
(November 2, 2019, 11:20 AM),
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority; David C.
Vladeck, Time to Stop Digging: Failed Attacks on FTC Authority to Obtain
Consumer Redress, 31 ANTITRUST ABA 89, 91 (2016).
59
See Paul, supra note 50 (“In the 1970s, Section 13(b) was used by the
Commission . . . primarily to obtain preliminary injunctions against corporate
acquisitions.”); see also, e.g., FTC v. U.S. Oil & Gas Corp., 748 F.2d 1431 (11th
Cir. 1984) (granting ancillary equitable relief in addition to injunctive relief); FTC v.
H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1982) (same).
60
See Paul, supra note 50.
61
Id.; A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission's Investigative, Law
Enforcement, and Rulemaking Authority, FTC.GOV (November 2, 2019, 11:20 AM),
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority.
62
See Paul, supra note 50.
58
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provided by State or Federal law. Nothing in this section shall be
construed to affect any authority of the Commission under any other
provision of law.”63 Courts have consistently relied on this language to
emphatically reject the argument that section 19 forecloses remedies
other than injunctions and restraining order under section 13(b).64
Jurisprudence
Every United States Court of Appeals, except for the Seventh
Circuit, that has interpreted the remedial scope of section 13(b) finds
that its text grants the FTC explicit authority to seek temporary
restraining orders and permanent injunctions as well as implicit
authority to seek disgorgement of unjust enrichment, restitution for
injuries suffered by consumers, and other equitable remedies.65 To be
clear, other equitable remedies are also included in the FTC’s own
interpretation of section 13(b) authority. But the Seventh Circuit has
now called this controlling interpretation of section 13(b) into
question. In order to understand the Seventh Circuit’s Credit Bureau
Center decision, an overview of cases relating to Courts of Appeals
interpretations of the remedial scope of section 13(b) and the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the remedial scope of similar statutes is
helpful.
Supreme Court Jurisprudence
While the Supreme Court has not yet directly spoken to whether
section 13(b) authorizes restitution awards, there are nonetheless key
Supreme Court cases interpreting other statutes that guide the
63

FTC Act § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 57b (emphasis added).
See, e.g., FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 654 F.3d 359, 367 (2d Cir. 2011)
(holding that “[s]ection 19 does not purport to limit Section 13(b). Quite the
contrary, Section 19 states that ‘[n]othing in this section shall be construed to affect
any authority of the Commission under any other provision of law.’”); FTC v. H.N.
Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1982) (same).
65
See, e.g., FTC v. World Travel Vacation Brokers, Inc., 861 F.2d 1020, 102428 (7th Cir. 1988); FTC v. U.S. Oil & Gas Corp., 748 F.2d 1431, 1432-35 (11th Cir.
1984); H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d at 1110-13.
64
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discussion of the FTC’s enforcement authority: Porter v. Warner
Holding Co.,66 Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 67 and
Meghrig v. Kfc W. 68
In Porter, the Court analyzed whether restitution is permitted
under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942.69 That Act states that
when the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration finds that
a person has engaged in conduct that violates the Act, then “upon a
showing by the Administrator that such person has engaged or is about
to engage in any such acts or practices a permanent or temporary
injunction, restraining order, or other order shall be granted” by the
court.70 The Court noted that the language of this statute invokes the
court’s equitable jurisdiction and that courts may go beyond the
matters immediately underlying that equitable jurisdiction and grant
“whatever other relief may be necessary” to ensure that equity does
“complete rather than truncated justice.”71 Expanding on this, even
though the Act did not explicitly authorize restitution, the Court
nonetheless held that an order for restitution of illegal rents was an
equitable adjunct to the explicitly authorized injunction decree.72
“Nothing is more clearly a part of the subject matter of a suit for an
injunction than the recovery of that which has been illegally acquired
and which has given rise to the necessity for injunctive relief.”73
Moreover, the Court warned that the full scope of the court’s equitable
jurisdiction should not be denied or limited “unless a statute in so
many words, or by necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the
court’s jurisdiction in equity.”74
The Supreme Court later affirmed this reasoning in Mitchell. In
Mitchell, the Court considered if lost wages may be recovered under
66

Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1959).
68
Meghrig v. Kfc W., 516 U.S. 479 (1996).
69
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 50 U.S.C. § 205(a); Porter, 328 U.S.
at 396.
70
Porter, 328 U.S. at 397.
71
Id. at 398.
72
Id. at 399.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 398.
67
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the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.75 That Act gives district courts
jurisdiction to “restrain violations of [the Act].”76 The Court rejected
the argument that jurisdiction to recover wages had to be “expressly
conferred by an act of Congress or be necessarily implied from a
congressional enactment” and instead found that the ability to “restrain
violations” inherently grants district courts jurisdiction to order
employers to reimburse wrongfully discharged or discriminatedagainst employees for wages lost as a result of that discharge or
discrimination.77 Notably, the Court in both Porter and Mitchell also
emphasized that the Court’s equitable jurisdiction should be
considered at its strongest since both cases implicated the public
interest.78 Where the public interest is concerned, “equitable powers
assume an even broader and more flexible character than when only a
private controversy is at stake.”79
In Meghrig, which the Seventh Circuit majority substantially
relied on in Credit Bureau Center, the Court reviewed a restitution
award under The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
(“RCRA”).80 Respondent KFC operated a Kentucky Fried Chicken
(“KFC”) restaurant in Los Angeles.81 While constructing the
restaurant, KFC discovered that the property it built the restaurant on
was contaminated with petroleum.82 KFC removed and disposed of
oil-tainted soil which cost a total of $211,000.83 KFC brought suit
under the RCRA’s citizen suit provision, section 6972, against the
previous owners of the property seeking restitution of the clean up
75
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3); Mitchell v. Robert
De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 289 (1959).
76
Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 289.
77
Id. at 289-92, 296 (stating that when Congress grants a court the power to
issue an injunction, it “must be taken to have acted cognizant of the historic power of
equity to provide complete relief in light of the statutory purposes”).
78
Id. at 291; Porter, 328 U.S. at 398.
79
Porter, 328 U.S. at 398; Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 291.
80
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6972;
Meghrig v. Kfc W., 516 U.S. 479, 482 (1996).
81
Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 482.
82
Id.
83
Id.
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costs since the previous owners had contributed to the waste.84 The
Court held that KFC’s suit against the previous owners failed based on
two provisions of section 6972(a).85 First, section 6972(a)(1)(B)
defines the necessary timing of an RCRA citizen suit; it permits
private parties to bring suit against persons “who ha[ve] contributed or
who [are] contributing to the past or present handling, storage,
treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste
which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to
health or the environment.”86 Second, section 6972(a) outlines the
remedies available to a district court in a suit brought under section
6972(a)(1)(B): district courts are permitted “to restrain any person
who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present
handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or
hazardous waste . . ., to order such person to take such other action as
may be necessary, or both.”87
The Court reasoned that the remedies described in section 6972(a)
show that the citizen suit provision does not contemplate providing
compensation for past clean up efforts.88 Instead, it allows for
mandatory injunctions—ordering a responsible party to “take action”
and clean up toxic wastes—and prohibitory injunctions—“restraining”
a responsible party from further violating the RCRA.89 The Court
further compared the RCRA’s language to the language of a similar
environmental statute, the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”).90 Based on
the language of CERCLA, the Court reasoned that Congress could
have explicitly provided for compensation for past clean up efforts in
the RCRA if it intended to. CERCLA’s citizen suit provision mirrors
84

Id.
Id. at 484.
86
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B)) (emphasis in original) (internal
quotations omitted).
87
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations
omitted).
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9601; id. at 483, 485.
85
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section 6972(a), as it gives district courts authority “to order such
action as may be necessary to correct the violation” under CERCLA.91
However, CERCLA differs from section 6972(a) in that CERCLA
expressly provides for the recovery of “all costs of removal or
remedial action” and “necessary costs of response” and further
provides that “any person may seek contribution from any other
person who is liable or potentially liable.”92 The RCRA lacks any
similar language. Based on this difference, the Court found that
Congress “demonstrated . . . that it knew how to provide for the
recovery of clean up costs, and that the language used to define the
remedies under RCRA does not provide that remedy.”93
The Court found further support in section 6972(a)(1)(B)’s
language stating that private parties may bring suit only when the
hazardous waste presents “an imminent and substantial endangerment
to health or the environment.”94 Focusing on the word “imminent” the
Court held that the RCRA is designed to remedy harms that are
occurring now rather than compensate for costs incurred in past clean
up efforts.95 Thus, KFC’s private citizen suit to recover the costs of
clean up necessarily failed.96
Seventh Circuit Jurisprudence Pre-Credit Bureau Center
Although Supreme Court precedent does not directly speak to
whether restitution is authorized under section 13(b) of the FTC Act,
Seventh Circuit caselaw prior to Credit Bureau Center does, and it
unequivocally favors a broad interpretation of the section’s remedial
scope.97 In FTC v. Amy Travel Service, Inc., the Seventh Circuit faced
a materially identical challenge to the scope of section 13(b) advanced

91

Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 485.
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 485-86.
96
Id. at 488.
97
See FTC v. Amy Travel Service, Inc., 875 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1989).
92
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in Credit Bureau Center.98 In Amy Travel, the FTC sued three
defendant corporations and two individuals for calling customers to
convince them to buy a vacation package and then, when the
customers agreed to purchase a package, misusing their credit cards by
charging them a higher price than they previously agreed to.99 This
scam affected more than 40,000 consumers.100
The FTC based its suit on section 13(b) of the FTC Act and tried
the case in front of a federal magistrate judge seeking rescission of
contracts, restitution, and injunctive relief.101 The magistrate judge
enjoined further sales by defendants and ordered restitution.102
Defendants appealed the magistrate judge’s finding. On appeal, the
Seventh Circuit—in an opinion penned by Chief Judge Wood, author
of the dissent to the denial for rehearing in Credit Bureau Center—
affirmed the magistrate judge’s holding and confirmed that section
13(b) of the FTC Act authorizes district courts to order “necessary
equitable relief” including restitution and rescission of contract in
addition to a permanent injunction.103 The Seventh Circuit conducted
an extensive analysis of equitable powers granted under section 13(b)
of the FTC Act, and fully considered defendants’ claim that monetary
relief is not permitted.104 The court noted that the power granted in
section 13(b) “carries with it the power to issue whatever ancillary
equitable relief is necessary to the effective exercise of the granted
power” and that “restitution [is a] proper form[] of ancillary relief.”105
The Seventh Circuit has reaffirmed this holding time and time again
since Amy Travel.106

98

See id.; FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC, 937 F.3d 764, 775 (7th Cir.

2019).
99

Amy Travel Service, 875 F.2d at 566-70.
Id. at 569.
101
Id. at 570.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 571-72.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 571.
106
See e.g., FTC v. Think Achievement Corp., 312 F.3d 259, 262 (7th Cir.
2002) (stating that “[t]he court's authority [under section 13(b)] to order restitution to
100
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Sister Circuit Jurisprudence
The broad interpretation of the FTC’s remedial authority under
section 13(b) finds considerable support in cases from the First,107
Second,108 Third,109 Fourth,110 Eighth,111 Ninth,112 Tenth,113 and
Eleventh114 Circuits. FTC v. Commerce Planet, Inc., a 2016 Ninth
Circuit decision that affirmed the circuit’s prior holdings authorizing
restitution awards under section 13(b), illustrates the reasoning
adopted across these eight circuits.115
In Commerce Planet, the Ninth Circuit upheld an $18.2 million
restitution award under section 13(b).116 The defendant provided
“online auction starter kits” to consumers for just the cost of shipping;
however, purchasers were not aware that by ordering a starter kit they
also agreed to purchase defendant’s monthly subscription product
“OnlineSupplier” and only became aware of that fact upon receiving
the first monthly charge.117 Any information alerting the consumer to
the monthly charges was hidden in fine print.118 The FTC brought suit
to enjoin this deceptive marketing practice and sought a restitution

the victims . . . is not and cannot be questioned.”); FTC v. Trudeau, 579 F.3d 754,
771 (7th Cir. 2009); FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 1997).
107
FTC v. Direct Mktg. Concepts, Inc., 624 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2010).
108
FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 654 F.3d 359, 365-66 (2d Cir. 2011); FTC v
Verity Int’l Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 66 (2d Cir. 2006).
109
FTC v. Magazine Sols., LLC, 432 F. App’x 155, 158 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011).
110
FTC v. Ross, 743 F.3d 886, 890-92 (4th Cir. 2014).
111
FTC v. Security Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 1312, 1314-15 (8th
Cir. 1991).
112
FTC v. AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC, 910 F.3d 417 (2018); FTC v. Commerce
Planet, Inc., 815 F.3d 593, 598-99 (9th Cir. 2016); FTC v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d
1088, 1102 (9th Cir. 1994); FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir.
1982).
113
FTC v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1202 n.6 (10th Cir. 2005).
114
FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 468-70 (11th Cir. 1996).
115
See Commerce Planet, 815 F.3d at 593.
116
Id. at 598.
117
Id. at 597.
118
Id.
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award.119 The Ninth Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Porter120 and held that “district courts have the power to order
payment of restitution under [section] 13(b) of the FTC Act.”121 “The
equitable jurisdiction to enjoin future violations of [section] 5(a)
carries with it the inherent power to deprive defendants of their unjust
gains from past violations” through a restitution award.122 In its
reasoning, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that section 19
eliminates a court’s power to award restitution under 13(b).123 The
court reasoned that section 19’s preservation of remedies provision124
explicitly precludes that line of argument and held that section 19
“does not eliminate the court’s inherent equitable power to order
payment of restitution.”125
FTC V. CREDIT BUREAU CENTER, LLC
Background and Procedural History
The Seventh Circuit decided FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC
on August 21, 2019.126 The case followed the FTC’s investigation of
Michael Brown, the sole owner and operator of a credit-monitoring
service called “Credit Bureau Center.”127 Brown created multiple
websites with similar misleading domain names to promote the service
119

Id. at 598.
Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
121
Commerce Planet, 815 F.3d at 599.
122
Id.; but see FTC v. AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC, 910 F.3d 417 (2018)
(O’Scannlain, J., concurring) (suggesting that the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of
section 13(b) should change because the text of the statute “unambiguously
foreclose[s] . . . monetary relief”).
123
Commerce Planet, 815 F.3d at 599.
124
FTC Act § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 57(b) (“Remedies provided in [section 19] are in
addition to, and not in lieu of, any other remedy or right of action provided
by State or Federal law. Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect any
authority of the Commission under any other provision of law.”) (emphasis added).
125
Commerce Planet, 815 F.3d at 599.
126
FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC, 937 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 2019).
127
Id. at 766 (hereinafter, Brown and Credit Bureau Center will be referred to
as “Brown” in accordance with the Seventh Circuit majority opinion).
120
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and used a “negative option feature” to lure unknowing customers to
sign up for his service which charged a monthly subscription fee.128
The websites advertised that potential customers could receive a “free
credit report and score,” and focused almost exclusively on those
offerings.129 However, the website failed to adequately alert customers
that applying for the free credit report and score also enrolled them in
a monthly credit monitoring service with a monthly subscription cost
of $29.94.130 A disclaimer regarding the monthly service did appear on
the website but in much smaller, buried text that did not provide any
explanation as to what the “membership subscription” entailed.131
Customers only discovered their enrollment in the service when they
received a letter from Brown after they were automatically enrolled.132
While Brown’s misleading websites were problematic, his
methods for luring customers to the websites were even more so.
Brown employed subcontractors who convinced customers to visit
these websites by posting fake advertisements for nonexistent rental
properties on Craigslist and instructing applicants to receive a free
credit score from the websites in order to continue with the rental
process.133 However, after potential “renters” received the credit score
they never heard from the Craigslist subcontractors again.134
Consumers were upset when they discovered their enrollment in the
monthly credit monitoring service and complained to Brown’s
customer service operators.135 Brown often agreed to cancel future
charges but refused to refund any past payments.136 Brown’s scheme—
no small operation—attracted more than 2.7 million customers and
generated over $6.8 million in total revenue.137 Credit-card companies
128

Id.
Id. at 767 (the websites had names such as “eFreeScore.com” and
“FreeCreditNation.com”).
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 768.
136
Id. (Credit-card companies canceled over 10,000 of Brown’s charges).
137
Id.
129
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that received complaints from customers cancelled over 10,000
charges for the credit monitoring service.138
Many of these consumers complained directly to the FTC,
prompting an investigation into Brown’s practices, and the FTC
formally sued Brown in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois under section 13(b) of the FTC Act in
January 2017.139 In court, the FTC sought an injunction to prohibit
Brown from continuing his marketing and a restitution award, alleging
that Brown’s Craigslist advertisements and websites violated the FTC
Act’s prohibition on “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” and that the
websites further violated the Restore Online Shopper Confidence Act
(“ROSCA”),140 the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”),141 and the
Free Credit Reports Rule.142 The District Court issued a temporary
injunction, froze Brown’s assets, and appointed a receiver to manage
Brown’s company.143 Brown and the FTC then filed cross-motions for
summary judgment, where Brown argued that section 13(b) does not
authorize an award of restitution and, alternatively, that it solely
authorizes equitable restitution rather than legal restitution in the form
of penalties.144 The FTC retained its position that restitution is
permitted under the FTC Act.145
The district court held that Brown’s Craigslist ads and his
websites violated the FTC Act and his websites additionally violated
ROSCA, the FCRA, and the Free Credit Reports Rule.146 The FTC
successfully obtained a permanent injunction against Brown, which
severely limited his ability to continue participating in the creditmonitoring industry, and the district court also found in favor of the

138

Id.
Id.
140
15 U.S.C. §§ 8401-8405.
141
15 U.S.C. § 1681.
142
Credit Bureau Center, 937 F.3d at 768.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id.
139
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FTC on the issue of whether restitution is permissible under 13(b).147
The district court, relying on settled Seventh Circuit precedent,148 held
that restitution was proper under section 13(b) and that Brown’s
fraudulent activity warranted an award in the amount of consumer
losses: $5,260,671.36.149
Seventh Circuit Appeal
On Appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Brown conceded his liability to
the Craigslist scheme.150 But Brown attempted to contest that his
websites violated the FTC Act or ROSCA.151 Judge Sykes, writing for
the majority, along with Judges Brennan and Manion rejected Brown’s
defenses and concluded that the websites clearly violated ROSCA
because the statute required disclosure of “‘all material terms of the
transaction’” “‘before obtaining the consumer’s billing information,’”
and Brown’s websites undisputedly failed to disclose that the monthly
subscription service is for a credit-monitoring service, a fact that the
court found material.152 The court found this to be a fatal oversight of
Brown’s liability defense.153
Brown next challenged the district court’s grant of a permanent
injunction.154 But, similar to his liability defenses, his argument
against the permanent injunction deserved little more than summary
treatment.155 He contended, under the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, that the

147

Id.; FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC., 325 F. Supp. 3d 852, 868 (N.D. Ill.

2018).
148

FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC., 325 F. Supp. 3d 852, 868 (N.D. Ill.
2018) (citing FTC v. Amy Travel Service, Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 571 (7th Cir. 1989);
FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 1997)).
149
Credit Bureau Center, 937 F.3d at 768.
150
Id. at 769.
151
Id.
152
Id. at 769-70 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 8403).
153
Id. at 770.
154
Id.
155
See id. at 770-71.
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injunction was “unconstitutionally harsh and disproportionate.”156 This
argument failed because the Seventh Circuit concluded that an
injunction is not a “fine” at all under the Excessive Fines Clause.157
Finally, Brown contested the $5,260,671.36 restitution award.158
He contended that since the language of section 13(b) of the FTC Act
does not explicitly grant the district court authority to award remedies
other than temporary restraining orders and injunctions that the
restitution award could not stand.159 In a lengthy discussion, the
Seventh Circuit attempted to “untangle” this question of statutory
interpretation that is “obscured by layers of caselaw.”160
First, the Seventh Circuit looked to the FTC Act and its remedial
structure as a whole, then narrowed in on the FTC’s enforcement
powers under section 13(b).161 The court recognized that the FTC has
several tools to enforce the FTC Act’s prohibition of unfair or
deceptive business practices.162 The FTC may use its cease-and-desist
power under section 5 and, once an order becomes final, may sue the
respondent for legal and equitable relief in court under section 19 if it
can prove that the respondent “would have known under the
circumstances” that the act was fraudulent.163 The court then noted
that section 13(b) is separate from the FTC’s cease-and-desist power
and permits the FTC to “forego any administrative adjudication . . .
and directly pursue a temporary restraining order and a preliminary or
permanent injunction in federal court.”164 But this is where
congruency between the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of section
13(b)’s remedial scope and the FTC’s own interpretation, along with
the interpretation of eight of its sister circuits, ends.
156

Id. at 770.
Id. at 770-71 (noting that Brown offered “an assortment of drive-by
arguments” to contest the permanent injunction but that each argument was “too
underdeveloped to establish an abuse of discretion”).
158
Id. at 771.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id.
157
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The Seventh Circuit first looked to the text, and began “with the
obvious”: section 13(b) only mentions temporary restraining orders
and injunctions, and restitution is not an injunction.165 The FTC did
not argue otherwise; rather, the FTC argued that section 13(b)’s grant
of restraining orders and injunctions implicitly authorizes
restitution.166 The court disagreed, finding that “[a]n implied
restitution remedy doesn’t sit comfortably with the text of section
13(b).”167 The court looked at section 13(b)’s requirement that a
respondent must be “violating” or “about to violate” a law, and found
that this language indicates that the statute is solely forward facing
whereas restitution is a backwards-facing remedy intended to rectify
past violations.168 The court even postured that including restitution
into a section 13(b) reading is “illogical” because it would mean that
the FTC could only secure restitution for past conduct when there is
ongoing or imminent unlawful conduct.169 The court found another
problem with implying restitution into section 13(b). Section 13(b)
also requires that the FTC “reasonably believe that enjoining an
ongoing or imminent violation would be in the public interest.”170 The
court reasoned that the public interest in stopping an ongoing harm is
inherently separate from remedying a past injury, and including both
in the same reading raises logical problems.171
Next, the Seventh Circuit considered the FTC’s authority under
section 5 and section 19 of the FTC Act and found that the language of
those provisions specifically authorizes broad equitable relief whereas
section 13(b)’s language conspicuously does not.172 Section 5
authorizes district courts to “grant mandatory injunctions and such
other and further equitable relief as they deem appropriate”173 and
section 19 authorizes “such relief as the court finds necessary”
165

Id.
Id. at 772.
167
Id.
168
Id. (noting that restitution is a remedy for past actions).
169
Id. at 772-73.
170
Id. at 773.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
FTC Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(l).
166
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including “the refund of money or return of property.”174 The court
presumed that since Congress included this particular language in
section 5 and 19 but not in section 13(b) that it did so intentionally and
purposefully.175 Further, the court held that “if section 13(b) permitted
restitution as a general matter, Congress would have had no reason to
enact [section 19], which authorizes restitution under narrower
circumstances.”176 And the court took further issue with the fact that
section 19 provides many protections to respondents before the FTC
can seek restitution,177 but section 13(b) does not offer any similar
protections.178 The Seventh Circuit refused to presume that Congress
intended to allow the FTC to circumvent qualifications by simply
seeking restitution under section 13(b) without clear indication from
Congress that it intended to do so.179 Moreover, the tensions amongst
section 5 and section 19 and section 13(b) are eliminated when section
13(b) is limited to injunctive relief that enjoins ongoing and future
violations.180
The Seventh Circuit held that the saving clause of section 19—
stating that the remedies in section 19 are to be in addition to other
remedies and nothing in the section should be construed to affect the
authority of other provisions of law—does not help the FTC’s
argument.181 The court stated that it will not read a saving clause to
allow section 19 to nullify itself. And regardless, even if the saving
clause had any effect, it only effects “remedies that exist” and so it

174

FTC Act § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b).
Credit Bureau Center, 937 F.3d at 773.
176
Id. at 774.
177
Id. (Noting that section 19 requires the FTC to give fair notice to
defendants; the FTC can forego the notice requirement only if it obtains a final
cease-and-desist order, brings a suit in court, and proves that the violator would
reasonably have known that their actions were dishonest or fraudulent. Additionally,
section 19 contains a three-year statute of limitations on bringing actions against
most violators.).
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Id. at 775.
175
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“does not inform the question whether section 13(b) contains an
implied power to award restitution.”182
The court considered the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Porter and
Mitchell but criticized them as being “typical of their era: The Court
would resolve ambiguities by identifying a statute’s purpose and
‘deducing the result most consonant with that purpose.’”183 Thus,
courts under the guidance of Porter and Mitchell freely crafted
remedies to enforce rights recognized by Congress.184 And caselaw
that authorizes restitution awards under section 13(b), including Amy
Travel, built off of this premise of Porter and Mitchell.185 The court,
relying on Meghrig, held that modern implied-remedies jurisprudence
no longer permits this line of reasoning.186 “Rather than presuming
that Congress authorizes the judiciary to supplement express statutory
remedies, the Court now recognizes that ‘the express provision of one
method of enforcing a substantive rule suggests that Congress
intended to preclude others.’”187 The Seventh Circuit thus overturned
Amy Travel, holding that Porter and Mitchell cannot be applied as they
were in Amy Travel because “it’s inescapable that Meghrig not only
displaced Amy Travel’s categorical approach to judicially implied
remedies but also its interpretation of section 13(b).”188

182

Id.
Id. (quoting William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics without Romance:
Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV.
275, 282 (1988)).
184
Id .at 777.
185
Id. at 777-78 (tracing section 13(b) interpretations based on Porter and
Mitchell beginning with the Second Circuit in H.N. Singer in 1982 and on to the
Seventh Circuit in Amy Travel in 1989, which formed the main basis for other
circuits concluding that section 13(b) authorizes restitution until the present day).
186
Id. at 780.
187
Id. at 782 (quoting Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct.
1378, 1385 (2015)).
188
Id. at 783.
183
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Dissent to Petition for Rehearing En Banc
Under Seventh Circuit Court Rule 40(e), when an opinion
overrules circuit precedent and creates a circuit split the opinion is
circulated to all judges in active service to vote on whether it should
be reheard.189 In a Rule 40(e) vote on Credit Bureau Center, a majority
of active service judges voted against a rehearing en banc and Chief
Judge Wood crafted a dissent to that refusal for rehearing; she was
joined by Judge Rovner and Judge Hamilton.190 The dissent, like the
majority, found that the text of section 13(b) answers the question at
hand, but came to the opposite conclusion as the majority as to what
that answer is.191 In the dissent’s view, the text “overwhelmingly . . .
support[s] the power of the FTC to use any of the tools that Congress
gave it, including the one it used here, which entitles it to seek
injunctive relief from a court.”192 While restitution is not an
“injunction” itself, the dissent reasoned that the injunction is the
“order from the court to do something or refrain from doing
something,” and a mandatory injunction “orders an affirmative act or
mandates a specified course of conduct.”193 Nothing in the text of
section 13(b) “deletes from the list of possible affirmative acts that an
injunction may include an order requiring the enjoined party to return
ill-gotten gains.”194 The dissent urged that such reasoning “should be
enough itself to show the error in the path the majority has taken.”195
The dissent cited California v. American Stores Co. to support its
textual argument. The Supreme Court in American Stores Co.
examined whether divestiture qualified as a form of injunctive relief
under section 16 of the Clayton Act.196 There, the Court answered in
the affirmative and held that “the statutory language indicates
189

Id. at 767 n. 1.
Id. at 786.
191
Id. at 787 (Wood, C.J., dissenting).
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Id.
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Id. at 787-88; California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271 (1990);
Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C § 26.
190

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol15/iss1/2

26

Noonan: To 13(b) or Not to Be? How the Seventh Circuit’s Narrow Interpret

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 15

Fall 2019

Congress’ intention that traditional principles of equity govern the
grant of injunctive relief.”197 The dissent in Credit Bureau Center
compared the divestiture at issue there to the equitable restitution at
issue here, and concluded that the two are “almost identical” since
both require the turnover of wrongfully obtained property.198
Moreover, the text of section 16 of the Clayton Act “is not materially
different from the language of section 13(b) of the FTC Act” and so
“the majority’s approach conflicts with the most closely applicable
Supreme Court decision.”199 And the majority did not point to any
Supreme Court case ruling that a federal agency must forego one type
of remedy that it holds to instead use another “as the majority has done
here.”200 To the contrary, the Supreme Court recognizes that agencies
have broad discretion to choose what tools it will use to accomplish its
mission.201
The dissent further disagreed with the majority’s interpretation
that Congress would not write a statute that provides for restitution as
a part of a section 13(b) injunction or restraining order because it
would be “wholly irrational” given the “less-streamlined options”
provided elsewhere in the FTC Act.202 The dissent reasoned that such a
conclusion ignores the differences among the FTC’s options.
Restitution under section 13(b) is the only available option if the FTC
wants restitution to “begin right away while the case is pending,” and
to choose that available option is a choice that agencies are usually
allowed to make.203 The dissent also criticized the majority’s use of a
line of cases involving implied private rights of action.204 These cases
are inapposite. The issue at hand involves a government agency rather
than a private party and the FTC operated under an express statutory
197

Credit Bureau Center, 937 F.3d at 788 (Wood, C.J., dissenting); American
Stores Co., 495 U.S. at 281.
198
Credit Bureau Center, 937 F.3d at 788 (Wood, C.J., dissenting).
199
Id.
200
Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 789.
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provision allowing the agency to seek injunctive relief instead of a
private right of action.205
Next, the dissent strongly contested the majority’s reliance on
Meghrig. In Meghrig, the Court based its analysis on a temporal line
drawn in the statute, that it applied only to “imminent” endangerment,
to hold that the statute did not allow for a repayment of past
expenditures; the Court in no way categorically excluded from
injunctive relief an order to make payments.206 Meghrig is further
inapposite since it concerned private plaintiffs rather than a
government plaintiff like the FTC. The dissent concluded that the
Government’s presence as a party points to the involvement of the
public interest, and where “the public interest is involved in a
proceeding, a court’s equitable powers assume an even broader and
more flexible character than when only a private controversy is at
stake.”207 The FTC, here, sought to “vindicate the public interest
through a public-facing remedy aimed at an ongoing harm” whereas
the private plaintiff in Meghrig sought a “backward-looking remedy
that in economic substance sought damages.”208 Thus Meghrig, and
cases following Meghrig, “do not come close to holding that a
government agency acting pursuant to express authority to seek
injunctive relief cannot ask for a mandatory injunction requiring
turnover of money” and should not control.209
The dissent then criticized the majority’s accusation that the eight
sister circuits adopting Amy Travel’s holding did so without much
thought. To the contrary, the dissent defended the Second Circuit’s
opinion in FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLP, emphasizing that the court
agreed with the decision in Amy Travel only after a “thorough and
thoughtful consideration” of the arguments.210
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THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN ITS DECISION
The Court Erred in its Textual Interpretation
The text of section 13(b) in no way precludes the authority of
courts to invoke their broad range of equitable powers. And finding
that section 13(b) authorizes restitution awards certainly is not a
“starkly atextual interpretation.”211 To be sure, the text only speaks of
restraining orders and injunctions. But, as Chief Judge Wood stated,
“[n]othing whatever in section 13(b) deletes from the list of possible
affirmative acts that an injunction may include an order requiring the
enjoined party to return ill-gotten gains, or to pay money to a court
escrow account, or otherwise to turn over property.”212 While the
majority found that finding authority to order restitution improperly
reads a remedy into section 13(b) that is not there, the same can be
said of the majority’s finding that section 13(b) does not permit
restitution. The court improperly reads a remedy out of section 13(b)
when there is no clear indication in the statute to support such a
reading. The majority instead should have looked to the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of section 16 of the Clayton Act in American
Stores, where the Court held that Congress intended to include
traditional principles of equity in its grant of injunctive relief in
section 16.213 Since the language of section 13(b) of the FTC Act is
“not materially different” from the language of section 16 of the
Clayton Act, American Stores properly guides the textual
interpretation of section 13(b).214
The Court Relied on Inapplicable Caselaw
The Seventh Circuit inappropriately grounded its reasoning in
Credit Bureau Center on the Supreme Court’s holding in Meghrig.
Meghrig is distinguishable since it applied to a private plaintiff
211
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seeking redress in a private cause of action rather than a Government
plaintiff bringing suit on behalf of the public interest.215 For this
reason, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Mitchell and Porter should
be controlling rather than its reasoning in Meghrig since Mitchell and
Porter involved Government plaintiffs vindicating the public interest,
like Credit Bureau Center, while Meghrig involved a mere private
dispute.216 The Court in Mitchell and Porter instructed that where
public interests are concerned, the court’s equitable powers should be
construed to be the most broad and flexible.217 The Seventh Circuit’s
decision here contradicted that guidance. Brown’s scheme directly
implicated the public interest and defrauded thousands of consumers,
but rather than expand the court’s inherent equitable powers in a case
so intimately connected with the public interest the Seventh Circuit
restricted the court’s equitable powers in a way that has never been
done before.218 The Seventh Circuit’s finding that implied remedies
jurisprudence has outgrown Porter and Mitchell is simply
unfounded.219 The Supreme Court cited Porter as recently as 2016 for
the above stated principle: “[w]hen federal law is at issue and ‘the
public interest is involved,’ a federal court's ‘equitable powers assume
an even broader and more flexible character than when only a private
controversy is at stake.’”220

215

Id. at 792-93.
See id. (government plaintiff vindicating the public interest); Mitchell v.
Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960); (same); Porter v. Warner
Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (same); but see Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479
(1996) (private plaintiffs bringing a citizen suit).
217
Porter, 328 U.S. at 398; Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 291.
218
See Credit Bureau Center, 937 F.3d at 786 (Wood, C.J., dissenting).
219
The Third Circuit and the Tenth Circuit have both recognized that Meghrig
did not overturn Porter and Mitchell and the cases remain controlling. See United
States v. Rx Depot, Inc., 438 F.3d 1052, 1057 n.3 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Meghrig did not
overrule or limit Porter and Mitchell”); United States v. Lane Labs-USA, Inc., 427
F.3d 219, 232 (3d Cir. 2005) (there is no indication, “either in Meghrig or since, that
the Court has abandoned the holdings of Porter and Mitchell”).
220
Kansas v. Nebraska, 574 U.S. 445, 456 (2015) (quoting Porter, 328 U.S. at
398).
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The majority further ignored Porter and Mitchell’s instruction that
equitable jurisdiction should not be denied or limited “in the absence
of a clear and valid legislative command. Unless a statute in so many
words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the
court’s jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be
recognized and applied.”221 No legislative command supports gutting
the equitable jurisdiction traditionally granted to courts under section
13(b).
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit should have looked to past
decisions involving regulatory enactments enforced by other federal
agencies which similarly suggest that where Congress grants authority
to an agency to use the equitable authority of the court then “Congress
should be held to have intended to invoke the full range of the court’s
equitable authority unless the statute provides otherwise.”222 Notably,
courts have upheld grants of monetary equitable relief under statutes
allowing district courts only to issue injunctions or orders of
enforcement in cases involving the Securities Exchange Commission,
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and the Interstate
Commerce Commission.223
CREDIT BUREAU CENTER’S IMPLICATIONS CALL FOR SUPREME COURT
REVIEW
As Chief Judge Wood aptly stated, the majority’s interpretation
“upends what the [FTC] and Congress have understood to be the status
quo for thirty years, and . . . grants a needless measure of impunity to
brazen scammers” engaged in deceptive business practices.224 That
result is reflected in the outcome of Credit Bureau Center alone.
221

Porter, 328 U.S. at 398; Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 291.
Paul, supra note 50 (emphasis added); see, e.g., Porter, 328 U.S. at 398;
Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 291.
223
See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307 (2d Cir. 1971);
CFTC v. Hunt, 591 F.2d 1211, 1223 (7th Cir. 1979); ICC v. B&T Transp. Co., 613
F.2d 1182, 1186 (lst Cir. 1980).
224
FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC, 937 F.3d 764, 797 (7th Cir. 2019)
(Wood, C.J., dissenting).
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Brown, after unlawfully pocketing millions of dollars through his
fraudulent scheme, will pay zero dollars to consumers in restitution.
Defendants like Brown will likely choose to litigate their claims rather
than agree to settlements with the FTC based on the possibility that,
like Brown, they will be able to avoid paying millions of dollars or any
amount at all.225 To be sure, defendants in every section 13(b) case
following Credit Bureau Center will raise the issue of whether the
FTC may pursue restitution awards and other equitable remedies under
section 13(b).226
Yet in the immediate wake of Credit Bureau Center, the FTC will
likely continue its present enforcement approach under section 13(b)
in every circuit except the Seventh Circuit. And the FTC will avoid
bringing section 13(b) cases in the Seventh Circuit altogether—a feat
that is entirely possible under section 13(b)’s favorable venue
provisions.227 Section 13(b)’s broad venue provisions allow the FTC to
bring suit in any district where a respondent “resides or transacts
business,” opening a wide range of possible venues in nearly every
section 13(b) case.228
But even so, Credit Bureau Center threatens to have a harmful
effect outside of just the Seventh Circuit. If Credit Bureau Center’s
holding is adopted in other circuits, or if the Supreme Court holds that
section 13(b) does not authorize courts to order restitution awards,
then the FTC would likely be left to its own administrative processes
to effectuate consumer redress.229 This would be detrimental since the
225

See Pava & DiPrima, supra note 35.
See id.; see also Federal Trade Commission v. Match Group, Inc., No. 3:19cv-02281, (N.D. Tex.) (defendants arguing in a motion to dismiss that restitution and
other forms of monetary relief are not available to the FTC under section 13(b)) (the
motion can be found at
https://www.law360.com/dockets/download/5da9c00efcfb470673796ab1?doc_url=h
ttps%3A%2F%2Fecf.txnd.uscourts.gov%2Fdoc1%2F177112777525&label=Case+F
iling).
227
FTC Act § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b)(2).
228
Id. (the venue provision, in relevant part, states: “Any suit may be brought
where such person, partnership, or corporation resides or transacts business, or
wherever venue is proper under section 1391 of title 28.”).
229
See Pava & DiPrima, supra note 35.
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FTC’s internal processes are slow moving, and without the FTC’s
ability to have courts freeze assets under section 13(b), an equitable
remedy often implied through section 13(b)’s grant of injunctive
authority, respondents may be able to dissipate unlawfully obtained
funds before restitution is possible through the administrative process.
The gravity of that effect on the FTC’s enforcement power, and its
overall agency power, cannot be overstated. To illustrate, between July
1, 2017 and June 30, 2018, the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection
obtained 114 court orders totaling $563 million and administered
refund programs to deliver more than $2.3 billion in refunds to
consumers.230 These numbers drastically decrease when the FTC’s
ability to obtain restitution under section 13(b) is removed, since filing
a direct suit for equitable relief is the most effective way that the FTC
obtains relief for unfair and deceptive business practices.231
In light of these concerns, the Supreme Court should grant the
FTC’s recently filed petition for certiorari in this case and reverse the
decision of the Seventh Circuit on review.232 Clarity from the Supreme
Court will resolve the circuit split created in Credit Bureau Center and
end ongoing confusion surrounding section 13(b). Until the Supreme
Court takes action to restore the full breadth of the FTC’s enforcement
See John E. Villafranco & Mindy Pava, “Untangling the Knot” or “A Grant
of Immunity to Brazen Scammers”? The 7th Circuit Rejects Restitution as a Remedy
under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, AD LAW ACCESS (September 30, 2019, 8:50
PM), https://www.adlawaccess.com/2019/08/articles/untangling-the-knot-or-a-grantof-immunity-to-brazen-scammers-the-7th-circuit-rejects-restitution-as-a-remedyunder-section-13b-of-the-ftc-act/.
231
See Paul, supra note 50.
232
The FTC filed a petition for certiorari on December 19, 2019. See Credit
Bureau Center LLC, FTC.GOV (Dec. 19,
2019), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/162-3120/credit-bureaucenter-llc-formerly-known-myscore-llc. Notably, petitions for certiorari have also
been filed in FTC v. AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC, 910 F.3d 417 (9th Cir. 2018) and
FTC v. Publishers Business Services, No. 17-15600 (9th Cir. 2018); two cases from
the Ninth Circuit upholding the FTC’s ability to obtain monetary relief under section
13(b). Both petitions for certiorari in AMG and Publishers Business Services were
filed on October 18, 2019.
230
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power under section 13(b), the FTC is powerless to effectuate timely
consumer redress in the Seventh Circuit and is more vulnerable than
ever in not just the Seventh Circuit, but in every jurisdiction.
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